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INTRODUCTION
For decades, bankruptcy reform has been controversial. Believing
that gaps in the then-existing bankruptcy laws provided the means by
which the bankruptcy system was being exploited1 and thus, the
impetus for at least some of the dissention, Congress enacted the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA).2 However, rather than improve matters, the legislation
arguably resulted in even more controversy. And though the
consequences of this legislation were not limited to any one form of
bankruptcy filing,3 an intense debate ensued with respect to a
* J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Tulane University, M.P.H., May 2003; University of Arkansas, B.S.,
May 1999.
1
See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005).
2
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in part as 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2005)).
3
Brett Weiss, “Not Dead Yet:” Bankruptcy After BAPCPA, MD. B.J., MayJune 2007, at 17, 18-20. For example, enactment of the BAPCPA resulted in, inter
alia, mandatory credit counseling for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filers, required
means testing to determine eligibility for Chapter 7, and refiling restrictions for
Chapter 7 debtors. Id.
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provision of the BAPCPA affecting Chapter 13 proceedings
exclusively.4 Specifically, the dispute centered around the “hanging
paragraph”—the unnumbered paragraph following § 1325(a)(9).5
The Seventh Circuit, in In re Wright, became the first court of
appeals to interpret the hanging paragraph.6 The decision in this case
limits the conditions under which a bankruptcy court shall confirm the
Chapter 13 repayment plan of a 910 debtor.7 It did so by holding the
debtor accountable for its original contractual obligations, where the
debtor proposed in its repayment plan, to surrender its 910 vehicle to
the 910 creditor.8
In In re Wright, at the time that the 910 debtors proposed their
Chapter 13 repayment plan, they owed more on the loan for their
vehicle than the vehicle was worth.9 Despite the difference between
the loan’s balance and the market value of the vehicle, the debtors
proposed a Chapter 13 repayment plan whereby they would surrender
their vehicle to the 910 creditor in full satisfaction of the debt.10 The
issue on appeal was whether the BAPCPA allowed the debtors to
surrender their vehicle in complete satisfaction of their debt
obligations or, alternatively, if the creditor was entitled to an unsecured
4

See In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 911 (Bankr. D. Ga. 2006).
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9). The “hanging paragraph” is so named, as it “has no
alphanumeric designation and merely dangles at the end of § 1325(a).” Dianne C.
Kems, Cram-a-lot: The Quest Continues, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2005, at 10.
6
492 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2007).
7
See id. at 833.
8
Id. A “910 creditor” is a creditor who possesses a purchase money security
interest (PMSI) in a vehicle acquired by a Chapter 13 debtor for the debtor’s
personal use during the 910 days prior to the debtor’s filing of a Chapter 13
bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). Similarly, the vehicle is referred to as
a “910 vehicle;” the debtor, a “910 debtor.” See id. Because the Bankruptcy Code
does not provide a definition of the term “purchase money security interest,” courts
interpreting it have looked to state law. In re Stevens, 368 B.R. 5, 8 (Bankr. D. Neb.
2007) (citing In re Price, 363 B.R. 734 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007)). Generally, a
“purchase money security interest” is defined as a security interest created when a
buyer uses the lender’s money to make the purchase and immediately gives the
lender security. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1127 (8th ed. 2005).
9
In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 831.
10
Id.
5
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claim in the amount of the difference that remained on the loan after
surrender.11 In affirming the decision of the bankruptcy court and
thereby adopting the minority view among bankruptcy courts, the
Seventh Circuit held that while the BAPCPA prohibits the application
of § 50612 to the claim of a 910 creditor, in the absence of § 506 the
debtor is left with its original, contractual responsibilities.13 The
Seventh Circuit looked to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(“U.C.C.”) and to the parties’ contract and concluded that upon the
debtors’ surrender of their vehicle, the creditor was “entitled to an
(unsecured) deficiency judgment for the difference between the value
of the collateral and the balance on the loan.”14
Section I of this note outlines the relevant bankruptcy law,
including the BAPCPA. Section II discusses the differing views
between the bankruptcy courts. Section III analyzes the Seventh
Circuit’s recent opinion in In re Wright. Section IV discusses why the
Seventh Circuit’s holding in In re Wright, that in the absence of § 506
the parties are left with their original contractual agreements, was
correct. Section V concludes that in adopting the minority view among
bankruptcy courts, the Seventh Circuit chose the proper interpretation
of the hanging paragraph.
I. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
In a time when consumers are bombarded with unsolicited offers
for credit, it is not surprising that they may sometimes find themselves
overextended and unable to meet their resulting payment obligations.15
Congress—by way of the Bankruptcy Code—attempted to provide

11

Id. at 830-31.
11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006).
13
In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 832-33.
14
Id. at 833.
15
See Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Speech before
the American Bankers Association on Credit Underwriting Standards (Sept. 27,
1998), in O.C.C. Q.J., Dec. 1998, at 108.
12
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relief to strained debtors in the form of a Chapter 7, Chapter 11, or
Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing.16
Chapter 13 is “a form of bankruptcy relief where the debtor
commits to repay a portion or all of his debts in exchange for receiving
a broad discharge of debt.”17 As such, a Chapter 13 filing is often used
by debtors who are “on the way up” as a result of an improved
financial situation.18 In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing, a debtor is
required to prepare a plan of repayment that must be confirmed by the
bankruptcy court.19 Pursuant to § 1325(a)(5),20 the court “shall
confirm” the plan if the debtor addresses its secured debt in one of
three ways.21 First, the creditor may agree to the debtor’s proposed
treatment of the creditor’s claim.22 Second, the debtor may keep the
collateral by allowing the creditor to retain the lien on the collateral
until the debtor has made payments totaling the amount of the
creditor’s claim.23 Finally, the debtor may surrender the collateral to
the creditor.24 It is in the context of the last alternative that the

16

See FCC v. NextWave Pers. Comm’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 305 (2003). While
the elements of these proceedings differ, the scope of this article is limited to
bankruptcy filings made pursuant to Chapter 13.
17
H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005).
18
Henry E. Hildebrand III, Unintended Consequences: BAPCPA and the New
Disposable Income Test, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2006, at 14.
19
11 U.S.C. § 1325.
20
11 U.S.C. §1325(a)(5).
21
Id. The pertinent part of the statute states the options for plan confirmation:
(A) the holder of [the secured] claim has accepted the plan;
(B) (i) the plan provides that—(I) the holder of [the secured]
claim retain the lien securing such claim until . . . (aa) the
payment of the underlying debt . . . and (ii) the value, as of the
effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under
the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed
amount of such claim; or . . . (C) the debtor surrenders the
property securing such claim to such holder.
Id.
22
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A).
23
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B). Courts have termed this process “cramdown.” In
re Wright, 492 F.3d 829, 830 (7th Cir. 2007).
24
11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5)(C).
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BAPCPA has created great discord among the bankruptcy courts.25
Namely, courts have had to address the effect of the newly added
hanging paragraph in this situation and answer the question of
whether, upon the debtor’s surrender of the vehicle, the 910 creditor
possesses an unsecured claim equal to the amount of any deficiency or
whether the surrender fully satisfies the 910 creditor’s claim.26
A. Pre-BAPCPA
Prior to the enactment of the BAPCPA, a Chapter 13 debtor was
given three options for the disposition of the collateral—convince the
creditor to accept the plan, keep the collateral and make payments
totaling the value of the collateral, or surrender the collateral to the
creditor. Further, in the simple—or at least simpler—pre-BAPCPA
times, the claims of all Chapter 13 secured creditors were treated
equally.27 The claims of a 910 creditor and any other Chapter 13
secured creditor were subject to § 506, which provides that:
(1) [a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on
property in which the estate has an interest, or that is
subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured
claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in
the estate’s interest in such property, or to the extent of the
amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such
creditor’s interest or the amount so subject to set off is less
than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be
determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of
the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in

25

See In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 911 (Bankr. D. Ga. 2006).
See In re Pinti, 363 B.R. 369 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Ezell, 338 B.R.
330 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006); In re Particka, 355 B.R. 616 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2006); In re Zehrung, 351 B.R. 675 (W.D. Wis. 2006).
27
See id. at 334-35.
26
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conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or
on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.28
Thus, the claims of all Chapter 13 secured creditors were subject
to bifurcation.29 As such, a Chapter 13 secured creditor, including a
910 creditor, was entitled to a secured claim in the amount of the value
of the collateral.30 Where the creditor’s claim exceeded this amount,
the creditor was entitled to an unsecured claim for the deficiency.31
Accordingly, the unsecured claim was treated identically to that of the
remaining general unsecured claims asserted by the debtor’s other
creditors.32
B. Post-BAPCPA
Although bankruptcy law has seen its fair share of changes, no
amendment since the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197833 has been as
comprehensive as the BAPCPA.34 Referred to as the “new bankruptcy
law”35, the BAPCPA was enacted in response to several factors36 that
Congress believed necessitated extensive reform of the Bankruptcy

28

11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006); see In re Ezell, 338 B.R. at 338.
See In re Ezell, 338 B.R. at 338-40.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 338-40.
32
See id.
33
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 254 (1978).
34
151 CONG. REC. H1993-01, at H2047-48 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement
of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“This legislation represents the most comprehensive
reforms of the bankruptcy system in more than 25 years.”).
35
E.g. The Law Offices of John T. Orcutt, Website Home Page,
http://www.billsbills.com (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
36
These factors include: the determination that the increase in bankruptcy
filings was not temporary but rather part of a consistent upward trend, the substantial
losses that resulted from bankruptcy filings, loopholes that allowed abuse of the
bankruptcy system, and findings that some bankruptcy debtors were able to repay
much of their debt. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005).
29
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Code.37 The most notable change effectuated by the BAPCPA was to
Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings—namely, the BAPCPA’s hanging
paragraph and its resulting effect on the claims of a 910 creditor.38
While the BAPCPA changed certain provisions, others, such as
§§ 1325(a)(5)(A)39 and (C),40 were left unchanged and
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)41 was modified largely to include more detailed terms
and specific requirements relating to the section.42 Consequently,
following the enactment of the BAPCPA, the debtor still had the same
three options for the disposition of the collateral—acceptance by the
creditor, retention of the collateral, or surrender of the collateral.43
However, the enactment of the BAPCPA added the hanging paragraph
to § 1325.44 This provision provides that:
[f]or purposes of paragraph (5),45 section 506 shall not
apply to a claim described in that paragraph if the creditor
has a purchase money security interest securing the debt
that is the subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within
the 910-day preceding the date of the filing of the petition,
and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle
(as defined in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the
personal use of the debtor, or46 if collateral for that debt

37

See generally Joseph Satorius, Note, Strike or Dismiss: Interpretation of the
BAPCPA 109(h) Credit Counseling Requirement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2231, 2237
(2007).
38
In re Morales, 359 B.R. 211, 215 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007).
39
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A) (2006).
40
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C).
41
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B).
42
In re Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 618 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006).
43
Id.
44
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in part as 11 U.S.C. § 1325).
45
This referenced paragraph is 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) which provides the
debtor with three methods by which to have a Chapter 13 repayment plan confirmed.
See supra Part IB.
46
As this second situation to which the BAPCPA applies is beyond the scope
of this article, it will not be discussed further.
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consists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred
during the 1-year period preceding that filing.47
As a result of the addition of the hanging paragraph, the claims of
all Chapter 13 secured creditors are no longer treated the same.48
Rather, the hanging paragraph distinguishes between the claims of 910
creditors and those of other Chapter 13 secured creditors.49 In so
doing, the BAPCPA prohibits the application of § 506 and, thus,
bifurcation of the claims of 910 creditors.50 Although the statute
prohibits bifurcation of the claim regardless of the debtor’s proposed
disposition of the vehicle,51 this prohibition leads to two very different
results depending on whether the debtor retains or surrenders the
vehicle.52
In the instance where the debtor proposes to retain the 910
vehicle, it is true that bifurcation is forbidden—but this is irrelevant, as
the debtor must agree to pay the 910 creditor the full value of the
creditor’s claim.53 In this scenario, the law is well-settled.54 However,
appropriate application of the law is less clear in the frequent scenario
where the debtor intends to surrender the vehicle to the 910 creditor.55
47

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006).
See In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 338 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006).
49
11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006); In re Ezell, 338 B.R. at 340.
50
11 U.S.C. § 1325.
51
Id.
52
See In re Zehrung, 351 B.R. 675, 678 (W.D. Wis. 2006).
53
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B).
54
See generally In re Shaw, 341 B.R. 543 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 2006); In re
Turner, 349 B.R. 431 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2006); In re White, 352 B.R. 633 (Bankr. E.D.
La. 2006); In re Solis, 356 B.R. 398 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). In this scenario, the
debtor must pay the full amount of the claim even if the vehicle is worth less than the
claim.
55
Compare In re Pinti, 363 B.R. 369, 369 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding
that a 910 creditor is not entitled to an unsecured claim for the amount of the
deficiency), and In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 330 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006) (910
creditor’s claim is fully satisfied upon surrender despite deficiency), with In re
Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 616 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006) (910 creditor entitled to an
unsecured claim in the amount of the deficiency), and In re Zehrung, 351 B.R. at
675 (creditor allowed to assert an unsecured claim for the amount of the deficiency).
48
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Suppose the debtor’s 910 vehicle was valued at $12,000 and the
creditor filed a claim in the amount of $15,000, representing the
amount owing on the loan. If the debtor keeps the vehicle—though the
claim is not bifurcated into a secured and unsecured portion—the
debtor must pay the creditor the full $15,000. This outcome is the
same in all courts. However, the result is not as clear in the scenario
where the debtor surrenders the vehicle. In courts adopting the
majority view, the creditor would only receive $12,000, satisfied by
the vehicle’s surrender. The debtor would not be responsible for the
remaining $3,000 even if the parties’ contract so provided. Conversely,
in courts subscribing to the minority view, the creditor would be
entitled to the full $15,000. The surrender of the vehicle would satisfy
$12,000 and the creditor would be allowed an unsecured claim for the
remaining $3,000.56
II. DISSENT THROUGHOUT THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS
Because of the difficulties encountered when interpreting the
hanging paragraph, two diverse series of opinions have emerged from
the bankruptcy courts.57 “As of last count—by a margin of 3–1—the
vast majority of reported cases favor the position . . . that the 910
creditor can, through the confirmation of a proposed plan, be
compelled to accept the surrender of its collateral in full satisfaction of
its claims.”58 Not only is there conflict among the various circuits but
conflicting opinions within circuits have also begun to emerge.59
56

A distinction must be made at this point. Although it is not likely that the
holders of general unsecured claims would be paid the full amount of their claim, the
holder of an unsecured claim is at least theoretically entitled to the full value of the
claim. How much the creditor receives, however, depends on, inter alia, the
bankruptcy estate’s value, the number and nature of the creditors, the amount of the
claims, and the number of claims.
57
In re Roth, No. 06-11330, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1647, at *2 (N.D. Ind. May 4,
2007), rev’d, No. 1:07-CV-135-TS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80162 (N.D. Ind. Oct.
25, 2007).
58
Id.
59
Compare In re Kenney, Nos. 06-71975-A, 07-70359-A, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS
1646 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May 11, 2007) (applying the majority position), with In re

9
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Consequently, this article does not endeavor to categorize circuits
based upon whether the circuit subscribes to the majority or the
minority view of the issue. Rather, the article sets forth each opposing
view and provides representative cases from the bankruptcy courts that
have adhered to the particular position. While the varying views will
be presented, the focus of this article is the Seventh Circuit’s decision
in In re Wright, whereby the Seventh Circuit adopted the minority
view that where there exists a deficiency after surrender, the creditor is
entitled to an unsecured claim for that amount.60
The importance of a consistent application of the hanging
paragraph among all bankruptcy courts is apparent in light of the fact
that this issue arises in a substantial number of consumer Chapter 13
bankruptcy proceedings.61 Considering the rising costs of litigation,
potential Chapter 13 debtors and 910 creditors alike would be wellserved by uniform treatment of the hanging paragraph.62
A. The Majority’s Interpretation of the Hanging Paragraph
A large number of courts adopting the majority interpretation
maintain the view that the language of the hanging paragraph is
unambiguous.63 These courts reason that the hanging paragraph
Long, No. 06-10601, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2423 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. Feb. 1, 2007)
(applying the minority approach).
60
492 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2007).
61
Id. at 831.
62
Id.
63
See In re Pinti, 363 B.R. 369, 376 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Wampler,
345 B.R. 730, 740 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006); In re Curtis, 345 B.R. 756, 760 (Bankr. D.
Utah 2006); In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 341 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006); In re Osborn,
348 B.R. 500, 504 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006); In re Quick, 360 B.R. 722, 728 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 2007); In re Steakley, 769, 770 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2007); In re
Bivins, No. 06-51778 RFH, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 519, at *8 (Bankr. D. Ga. Feb. 23,
2007); In re Feddersen, 355 B.R. 738, 741 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2006); In re Pool, 351
B.R. 747, 752 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006); In re Nicely, 349 B.R. 600, 604 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 2006); In re Payne, 347 B.R. 278, 282 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006); In re Long, No.
06-30651, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1605, at *30 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. July 12, 2006).
Similarly, a number of courts subscribing to the minority view have also found the
statute to be unambiguous. See In re Morales, 359 B.R. 211, 215 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.

10
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explicitly states its applicability to a 910 claim and expressly prohibits
bifurcation of the claim.64 Arguing that the invocation of § 506 is the
sole means of bifurcating a creditor’s claim, the courts assert that in
the absence of § 506, a 910 creditor is not allowed to bifurcate its
claim.65
The bankruptcy court in In re Pinti acknowledged that the
hanging paragraph was “poorly drafted” but found the language of the
statute to be unambiguous.66 Though the In re Pinti court recognized
that state law controls the creation and perfection of a lien, the court
held this to be the extent of state law’s authority with respect to the
lien and any claim that may arise in relation to it once the debtor has
entered into bankruptcy.67 After the filing of the debtor’s bankruptcy
petition, the “Bankruptcy Code, and not state law, determines whether
and to what extent such claim should be allowed in the bankruptcy
estate.”68 The court asserted that § 506 was the “starting point” in
making this determination.69 Because the court maintained that the
hanging paragraph prohibits application of this provision to claims by
910 creditors, the court held that the creditor was not entitled to an
unsecured claim for the deficiency.70 Additionally, the court noted that
its holding would remain unchanged regardless of whether the debtor
retained or surrendered the 910 vehicle.71

2007); In re Hoffman, 359 B.R. 163, 166 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006); In re Particka,
355 B.R. 616, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006).
64
See In re Pinti, 363 B.R. at 376; In re Wampler, 345 B.R. at 736; In re Quick,
360 B.R. at 722; In re Payne, 347 B.R. at 278.
65
See supra note 64.
66
363 B.R. at 369.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
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B. The Minority’s Position of the Applicability of the Hanging
Paragraph
A minority of bankruptcy courts hold that a 910 creditor may
assert an unsecured claim for any amount remaining after the debtor’s
surrender of the 910 vehicle.72 Although these courts reach the same
end result, they utilize different arguments to arrive at the conclusion.
Some courts, such as the Seventh Circuit in In re Wright, maintain that
with § 506 gone, both the debtor and creditor are left with their
contractual rights and obligations, as defined by state law.73 According
to the courts that adopt this reasoning, where the contract and/or the
appropriate UCC provision of the state provides for a deficiency, the
910 creditor is entitled to assert an unsecured deficiency claim for that
amount.74 Because of this entitlement, the 910 creditor may not be
forced to accept the vehicle in full satisfaction of the creditor’s
claim.75 Other courts maintain that where the debtor surrenders the
910 vehicle, it passes out of the bankruptcy estate and is no longer
confined by the strictures of § 506.76 In these courts, because the
bankruptcy law does not apply, the parties are left to their original
contractual obligations. Still other courts assert that the language of
the statute is ambiguous.77 Finding that the legislative history
demonstrates Congress’s intent that the BAPCPA provide greater
protection to 910 creditors, these courts hold that the creditor is
entitled to assert an unsecured claim for any deficiency.

72

See, e.g., In re Morales, 359 B.R. 211, 217 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007); In re
Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 629 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006); In re Zehrung, 351 B.R. 675,
678 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2006); In re Duke, 345 B.R. 806, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
2006).
73
492 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2007).
74
Id.
75
See sources cited supra note 72.
76
See, e.g., In re Zehrung, 351 B.R. at 678.
77
See, e.g., id. at 678.
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1. Upon Its Surrender, the 910 Vehicle is No Longer Part of the
Estate78
The bankruptcy court in In re Zehrung recognized that the
BAPCPA prohibits the use of § 506 for the claims of 910 creditors but
found that this was not the relevant provision of the bankruptcy code.79
This provision applies only when the bankruptcy estate retains an
interest in the 910 vehicle—an interest which “disappears with
surrender.”80 The court found its interpretation of the hanging
paragraph to be consistent not only with the statute’s language but also
with Congress’s intent in enacting the legislation.81 The In re Zehrung
court noted that the title of the section of the BAPCPA which added
the hanging paragraph is “Section 306—Giving Secured Creditors Fair
Treatment in Chapter 13 . . . Restoring the Foundation for Secured
Credit.”82 Given Congress’s express objectives, the court found it
improbable that the BAPCPA was intended to abrogate the rights of a
910 creditor to an unsecured deficiency claim—a right that the
creditors were entitled to prior to the enactment of the statute.83 The
court further noted the result obtained under the majority’s approach—
the expansion of rights to the creditor where the debtor keeps the
vehicle and the reduction of rights to the creditor where the collateral
is surrendered.84 Consequently, the court held that the creditor was
entitled to liquidate the vehicle and assert an unsecured claim for the
remaining balance.85

78

See supra note 72.
351 B.R. at 677-78.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 678.
79
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2. The Hanging Paragraph is Ambiguous86
Because the court in In re Duke found the language of the hanging
paragraph to be ambiguous, it looked to the legislative history.87 While
the court acknowledged that the history is limited, it discerned
indicators that Congress, in passing the BAPCPA, sought to
discourage bankruptcy abuse.88 Like the court in In re Pinti, the In re
Duke court noted that the title of the section of the BAPCPA which
added the hanging paragraph is, “Section 306—Giving Secured
Creditors Fair Treatment in Chapter 13 . . . Restoring the Foundation
for Secured Credit.”89 Therefore, the court reasoned that it was clear
that Congress intended to provide secured creditors with greater
protection.90 Forcing a creditor to accept surrender of the collateral in
full satisfaction of its claim would eliminate the creditor’s deficiency
claim and was therefore contrary to Congress’s purpose behind
enacting the statute. Absent a clear indication that Congress intended
this “anti-deficiency” result, the court held that upon surrender of the
vehicle, the creditor was entitled to pursue the remedies available to it
under state law.91 Namely, the creditor was entitled to an unsecured
claim in the amount of the deficiency.92
III. IN RE WRIGHT: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT BECOMES THE FIRST COURT
OF APPEALS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE
In In re Wright, the Seventh Circuit was asked to decide whether
the hanging paragraph precluded a 910 creditor from asserting an
unsecured claim for the amount of the balance that remained after the
debtors’ surrender of the automobile.93 The debtors in In re Wright
86

In re Duke, 345 B.R. 806, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006).
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
In re Wright, 492 F.3d 829, 829 (7th Cir. 2007).
87
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purchased a vehicle and, in so doing, entered into a contract where
they agreed to be responsible for any deficiency in the event that the
vehicle was seized and liquidated due to non-payment.94 Within 910
days of the purchase, the debtors filed their bankruptcy petition.95
They subsequently proposed a Chapter 13 repayment plan whereby
they would surrender the vehicle to the creditor in full satisfaction of
the loan.96 The debtors did not propose to pay any of the deficiency
and as a result, the bankruptcy judge declined to confirm their Chapter
13 plan.97 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A),98 the bankruptcy
judge certified that the case satisfied subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of the
statute.99 The Seventh Circuit accepted the bankruptcy court’s
certification, noting that this issue arises in a large number of
consumer cases but appears to be “stuck” in the bankruptcy courts.100
The court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court and in doing
94

Id. at 830.
Id. at 832.
96
Id. at 831.
97
Id.
98
Id. The statute provides:
The appropriate court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals described in the first sentence of subsection (a) if the
bankruptcy court, the district court, or the bankruptcy
appellate panel involved, acting on its own motion or on the
request of a party to the judgment, order, or decree described
in such fist sentence, or all the appellants and appellees (if
any) acting jointly, certify that – (i) the judgment, order or
decree involves a question of law as to which there is no
controlling decision of the court of appeals for the circuit or of
the Supreme Court of the United States, or involves a matter
of public importance; (ii) the judgment, order, or decree
involves a question of law requiring resolution of conflicting
decisions; or (iii) an immediate appeal from the judgment,
order, or decree may materially advance the progress of the
case or proceeding in which the appeal is taken; and if the
court of appeals authorizes the direct appeal of the judgment,
order, or decree.
28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) (2006).
99
In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 831.
100
Id. at 833.
95
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so adopted the minority view among bankruptcy courts.101 The court
agreed that the hanging paragraph eliminates the application of § 506
to the claims at issue and thus the requirement that claims be
bifurcated into secured and unsecured claims.102 However, the Seventh
Circuit argued that § 506 is not “the only source of authority for a
deficiency judgment when the collateral is insufficient.”103
Judge Easterbrook considered the United State Supreme Court’s
decision in Butner v. United States,104 and the court’s holding that
when the Code does not provide a federal rule, state law determines
rights and obligations.105 Because the hanging paragraph prohibits the
application of § 506 to 910 claims post-BAPCPA, the debtors were left
with their original contractual obligations and the 910 creditor was left
with its rights specified in the contract.106 The contract that debtors
entered into with the creditor provided that if the loan was not paid,
the vehicle would be seized and sold.107 Further, the contract explicitly
provided that upon seizure and liquidation of the automobile, the
creditor would refund any surplus to the debtors.108 However, in the
event that the vehicle was sold for less than the amount of the loan, the
debtors “shall be liable for any deficiency.”109 This contract, Judge
Easterbrook held, created a secured loan with recourse against the
borrower.110 The contract further provided that the parties were
entitled to all of their rights as specified in the U.C.C.111 The court
then consulted 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-615(d),112 the applicable
101

Id. at 832.
Id.
103
Id.
104
440 U.S. 48 (1979).
105
In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 832.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
The pertinent part of 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-615(d)(2) (2007) states that,
“If the security interest under which a disposition is made secures payment or
performance of an obligation, after making the payments and applications required
102
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U.C.C. provision enacted by Illinois, and held that upon surrender of
the automobile, the creditor was entitled to an unsecured claim for the
difference between the car’s value and the balance of the loan.113
Judge Easterbrook went on to pose a hypothetical in which debtors
surrendered the automobile just one day prior to the filing of their
Chapter 13 petition.114 The court reasoned, based upon the parties’
contract and the appropriate Illinois statute,115 that under those
circumstances, the creditor would have been entitled to assert an
unsecured claim for any amount by which the loan exceeded the value
of the vehicle.116 The Seventh Circuit noted this anomalous
outcome117—the creditor would have been allowed a deficiency the
day before filing a bankruptcy petition but denied a deficiency just one
day after filing.118 Not finding an operative provision in the Code to
the contrary, Judge Easterbrook then looked to the title of the statute
that enacted the hanging paragraph.119 Discerning what he believed to
be Congress’s intent to provide protection for secured creditors, Judge
Easterbrook reasoned that the hanging paragraph replaced a “contractdefeating provision such as § 506” (which allows judges rather than
the market to value the collateral and set an interest rate, and may
prevent creditors from repossessing [the vehicle]) with the agreement
freely negotiated between debtor and creditor.”120
Judge Easterbrook also refuted the assertions of the National
Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, appearing as amicus
curiae, that the hanging paragraph completely eliminates the 910

by subsection (a) and permitted by subsection (c) . . . the obligor is liable for any
deficiency. 810 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/9-615(d)(2).
113
In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 832.
114
Id.
115
810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-615(d)(2).
116
In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 832.
117
Id. While other events are triggered the day after filing bankruptcy where
they would not have been the day before bankruptcy, the court seemingly found this
result inconsistent with Congress’s purpose in enacting the BAPCPA. See id. at 832.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
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creditor’s secured status.121 The reasoning of the amici was flawed, the
court asserted, because it assumed that § 506 was the only source in
bankruptcy of a secured creditor’s rights.122 These considerations led
Judge Easterbrook to hold that while the debtors were not required to
pay the unsecured debt in full any more than they were obligated to
pay the full amount of their other unsecured debts, the creditor’s
unsecured claim could not “be written off in toto while other
unsecured creditors are paid some fraction of their entitlements.”123 In
other words, Judge Easterbrook decided that the creditor was allowed
at least the right to receive a portion of its unsecured claim—the same
percentage that other creditors with unsecured claims were entitled.
IV. The Seventh Circuit Made the Right Decision in In re Wright
In In re Wright, the Seventh Circuit made an important decision:
in cases where the value of the 910 vehicle is insufficient, § 506 does
not provide the sole source of authority for a deficiency judgment.124
This determination is not only consistent with the statute and state law
but it is also in line with Congress’s purpose in enacting the BAPCPA.
A. The Hanging Paragraph and State Law
In Butner v. United States125 the Supreme Court, desiring uniform
treatment of property interests in state and federal courts, held that,
Property interests are created and defined by state law.
Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there
is no reason why such interests should be analyzed
differently simply because an interested party is involved in a
bankruptcy proceeding.126
121

Id.
Id. at 833.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 832.
125
440 U.S. 48 (1979).
126
Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
122
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The Court went on to note that the justifications for applying state
law were not limited to ownership interests.127 Rather, the Court
expanded the application to security interests as well.128 The Seventh
Circuit interpreted this language to mean that unless there is a
provision in the Bankruptcy Code that says otherwise, state law
governs the parties’ rights under a contract.129 Prior to the enactment
of the BAPCPA, there was a provision in the Code—§ 506— that
provided otherwise.130 There is no dispute. There also is no
disagreement that this provision still exists with respect to non-910
creditors. However, as the majority courts so steadfastly maintain, the
BAPCPA expressly prohibits the application of § 506 to the claims of
910 creditors. Consequently, as the majority courts argue, there is no
applicable bankruptcy provision that applies with respect to the
bifurcation of a 910 creditor’s claim.131 Applying the Supreme Court’s
holding in Butner, state law applies.132 As the Seventh Circuit held, in
the case where parties have contracted for particular rights, they are
entitled to those rights.133
The Seventh Circuit’s approach is also consistent with Article 9 of
the U.C.C. The purpose of Article 9 of the U.C.C. is “to provide a
simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of
present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less
cost and with greater certainty.”134 It provides parties with recourse so
that they will freely contract with others, which is crucial in our
market-driven economy. The Seventh Circuit recognized the
importance of the parties’ contract; namely, that the debtors explicitly
agreed to be responsible for any deficiency.135 And the courts’ holding
resulted in the parties’ actual contract having meaning—legal
127

Id.
Id.
129
In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 832.
130
In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 338 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006).
131
In re Duke, 345 B.R. 806, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006).
132
440 U.S. 48 at 48 (1979).
133
In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 832.
134
UCC 9-101 cmt.
135
In re Wright, 492 F.3d at 832.
128
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meaning—rather than simply being a means by which the debtors
were able to get what they wanted, to the detriment of the creditor.136
To adopt the majority’s view would obviate the need to contract
because parties would not be held to them. This would further have the
adverse effect of striking a serious blow to the effectiveness of Article
9 and precluding parties from relying on the security interests.
B. The Reason for the BAPCPA
One of the factors that led to the enactment of the BAPCPA was
abuse of the bankruptcy system.137 As discussed earlier, the enactment
of the BAPCPA resulted in a provision applicable only to those debtors
acquiring a vehicle shortly before filing bankruptcy. By singling out
these debtors, Congress was seemingly concerned about their potential
for abuse. It hardly seems rational that Congress would enact a
provision targeting a potentially abusive debtor which afforded the
debtor more opportunity to abuse the system after the enactment of the
statute than the debtor had prior to. The Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation is in harmony with this reasoning. Adoption of the
majority courts’ reasoning would have an outcome that Congress
surely could not have intended.
Further, while the BAPCPA’s legislative history is dearth, the title
of the section that enacted the BAPCPA clearly indicates that it was
enacted to protect secured creditors.138 While one majority court was
not convinced that its holding was “adverse to the position of a
secured creditor,”139 under the reasoning of the majority courts,
secured creditors will be denied that to which they are entitled—that to
which they lawfully contracted for. If the amount of litigation brought
by secured creditors with respect to this issue is not conclusive proof
of the secured creditors’ belief that the majority courts’ holdings are
“adverse” to their interests, surely it at least must be extremely
136

Id.
See source cited supra note 36 and accompanying text.
138
In re Zehrung, 351 B.R. 675, 678 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2006); In re Wright,
492 F.3d at 832.
139
In re Quick, 360 B.R. 722, 728 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007).
137
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persuasive. In In re Wright, the Seventh Circuit did protect the secured
creditor, consistent with the purpose of the BAPCPA, by affording
them an unsecured deficiency claim.140
CONCLUSION
While the language of the BAPCPA is clear, the interpretation
given to it by the majority courts is not only contrary to its plain
meaning but also to Congress’s motivations behind enacting the
legislation. A major factor underlying the need for the statute was to
protect secured creditors. However, under the majority court’s
interpretation, secured creditors are in a worse position following the
enactment of the statute than they were before the legislation. It is
hardly affording the secured creditor greater protection when you take
away its entitlement to an unsecured claim—a right that it had
previously enjoyed. Further, these contracted rights represent the very
foundation upon which Article 9 of the U.C.C. is built. Depriving
secured creditors of them while entitling unsecured creditors to these
rights renders Article 9 a nullity and fails to pass “logical muster.”141
In In re Wright, the Seventh Circuit adopted the correct interpretation.
And by holding the 910 debtors to their original contractual
obligations, the court’s holding is consistent with the plain meaning of
the statute, Congress’s purpose for enacting the statute, and Article 9.
Though the debate continues with little possibility of subsiding
soon, it is clear that in courts adopting the majority view, 910 debtors
will continue to have the opportunity to abuse the bankruptcy system
to the detriment of 910 creditors—exactly what the BAPCPA was
intended to prevent. As such, it is imperative that the majority courts
adopt the view to which the Seventh Circuit subscribes. It is then that
secured creditors will be given the protection that they expect, the
protection that Congress desired them to have, and the protection that
they have contracted for.

140
141

492 F.3d at 832.
In re Quick, 360 B.R. 722, 728 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2007).
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